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I. INTRODUCTION
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA)1 changed the long-standing
practice of allowing full deductions for state and local income and property
taxes (SALT) as a personal itemized deduction from federal income taxes.
*
© 2019 William B. Barker. Distinguished Professor of Law and Polisher
Family Faculty Scholar, Penn State Dickinson Law.
1. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C. (2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
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Congress accomplished this by limiting the maximum allowable deduction
to $10,000.2 In doing so, Congress eliminated a substantial portion of one
of the largest deductions available to individuals.3
Congress changed several other provisions that also have a substantial
impact on the value of the deduction for state and local taxes for individuals.
First, the standard deduction increased to just under twice the amount of
the previous standard deduction.4 Second, Congress limited the deduction
for qualified residence interest, a second personal itemized deduction.5 Third,
Congress eliminated the employee business expense deduction.6 Fourth
and fifth, Congress eliminated most casualty loss deductions7 and lowered
the tax rates on individuals.8 Businesses and investments held directly or
indirectly by individuals through entities—including partnerships, limited
liability companies, and Subchapter S Corporations—are also limited in
deducting state and local income tax on business income because income
taxes are only deductible by individuals as personal itemized deductions.9
Although the Act did not limit income tax deductibility for corporations,10
Congress substantially decreased the tax savings value of the deduction by
reducing the corporate tax rates from up to 35%11 to 21%.12

2. Id. § 11042(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 164(b)(6)).
3. See infra text accompanying note 52.
4. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11021 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 63(c)).
5. See id. § 11043 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)).
6. See id. § 11045(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 67(g)).
7. See id. § 11044 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 165(h)); see infra text accompanying
note 43.
8. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11001 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1(j)). The
tax brackets for unmarried individuals changed as follows:
2017
$9,325 or less
Over $9,325 - $37,950
Over $37,950 - $91,900
Over $91,900 - $191,650
Over $191,650 - $416,700
Over $416,700 - $418,400
Over $418,400

10%
15%
25%
28%
33%
35%
39.6%

2018
$9,525 or less
Over $9,525 - $38,700
Over $38,700 - $82,500
Over $82,500 - $157,500
Over $157,500 - $200,000
Over $200,000 - $500,000
Over $500,000

10%
12%
22%
24%
32%
35%
37%

Compare I.R.C. § 1(c) (2012), with I.R.C. § 1(j)(C) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
9. See id. §§ 63, 67(g), 164 (2015 & Supp. 2018).
10. See Kyle Pomerleau, The United States’ Corporate Income Tax Rate Is Now
More in Line with Those Levied by Other Major Nations, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://taxfoundation.org/us-corporate-income-tax-more-competitive/ [https://perma.cc/
32UW-T4YK].
11. I.R.C. § 11(b) (2012).
12. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 13001 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 11(b)).
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Over the years, the SALT deduction has been the subject of debate
regarding its rationale, effectiveness, and fairness.13 Often ignored in this
debate is the effect the SALT deduction has on the ability of state governments
to carry out their appropriate responsibilities supported by taxation.14
Four states recently filed a lawsuit against the federal government seeking
elimination of the SALT cap on the basis “that it will [make it] more
difficult for the states to maintain their taxation and fiscal policies.”15
Seldom considered is the fact that the SALT deduction is a mechanism for
mitigating the burden on taxpayers caused by double taxation of the same
income.16 This paper will focus on the role the SALT deduction has had
on the ability of state and local governments to finance public benefits,
including its role in mitigating double taxation. It will also examine the
TCJA’s dramatic change in the tax value of the SALT deduction that leads
to increased interstate tax competition in a federal system.
Part II provides a brief history of the SALT deduction and the efforts
previously made to eliminate or curtail its impact. Part III undertakes
a detailed explanation of the financial effect the changes have on taxpayers.
Part IV examines the problems of taxation in a federal system, outlining
the structure of fiscal federalism and how American states perform a unique
governmental role. Part V reviews multijurisdictional taxation of the same
economic activities of taxpayers and the ways the tax laws have been designed
to eliminate its adverse effects. Part VI analyzes the reasons for tax competition
and how the limitation on the SALT deduction increases its effect.

13. For a history of the SALT deduction, see infra Part II; sources cited infra note 22.
14. See Kelly Phillips Erb, States Sue IRS, Treasury to Strike Down SALT Cap
Under New Tax Law, FORBES (July 17, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kellyphillipserb/2018/07/17/states-sue-irs-treasury-to-strike-down-salt-cap-under-newtax-law/ [https://perma.cc/7UVY-WFVM].
15. Id.
16. See GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, THE IMPACT OF ELIMINATING THE STATE AND
LOCAL TAX DEDUCTION 3–4, 12 (2017), https://www.gfoa.org/sites/default/files/RCC%
20Report%20on%20SALT%20Deduction-092017_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7V8-M4XP];
see also Scott Drenkard, Is the State and Local Tax Deduction in Place to Protect Against
Double Taxation?, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/state-local-taxdeduction-place-protect-double-taxation/ [https://perma.cc/YDM4-E9GF].
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION FOR STATE
AND LOCAL TAXES
Since the introduction of the modern federal income tax in 1913, all
state and local taxes that were not a direct fee for a benefit received were
deductible from the federal income tax base.17 In 1964, Congress made
the language of the § 164 allowance of a deduction more explicit by identifying
specific taxes—including state and local real and personal property taxes,
income tax, general sales tax, and motor fuels tax.18
The first substantive change in the SALT deduction, however, was enacted
in 1986.19 In 1984, the U.S. Treasury proposed the complete elimination
of the deduction for individuals,20 which was adopted in the President’s
tax proposals to Congress.21 These proposals led to significant discussion
in the economic literature.22 The final 1986 legislation, however, eliminated
the deduction for state general sales taxes only.23
Since then, many proposals have been made to completely eliminate the
SALT deduction.24 However, the Code moved in the opposite direction
with the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which reinstated the deduction
for state and local general sales taxes as an option in lieu of deducting
state and local income taxes.25 The purpose of this measure was to provide
a more equitable regime to taxpayers in states that did not have an income
17. See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (reducing tariff duties
and providing revenue for the Government and for other purposes).
18. See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 207(a), 78 Stat. 19, 40 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 164(a) (1964)).
19. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 134(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085,
2116 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 164(a) (1988)).
20. 1 OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
78–81 (1984), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-TaxReform-v1-1984.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPV2-BKPJ].
21. See RONALD REGAN, THE PRESIDENT’S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR
FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 62–69 (1985) https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
tax-policy/Documents/Report-Reform-Proposal-1985.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZXN-D89N].
22. See, e.g., George F. Break, Tax Competition and Federal Tax Deductibility, 39
NAT’L TAX J. 349, 350–51 (1986); Martin S. Feldstein & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Effect of
Federal Tax Deductibility on State and Local Taxes and Spending, 95 J. POL. ECON. 710,
710–11, 720, 726–27, 730 (1987). For a thorough treatment of the issues, see Kirk J. Stark,
Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State
and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1391, 1394–95 (2004).
23. See Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 134(a)(1) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 164(a)).
24. FRANK SAMMARTINO & KIM RUEBEN, TAX POL’Y CTR., REVISITING THE STATE
AND LOCAL TAX DEDUCTION 16 (2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/
alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000693-Revisiting-the-State-and-Local-Tax-Deduction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E39Y-VYCP].
25. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 501(a), 118
Stat. 1418, 1520 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 164(b) (2006)).
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tax.26 Since 2004, the total elimination of the SALT deduction has been
a feature of many tax reform proposals.27 These proposals were influential
in the changes contained in the TCJA.
III. THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT OF 2017: HOW IT WORKS AND HOW
IT AFFECTS STATE AND LOCAL TAXES
Section 11042 of the TCJA is straightforward and appears clear in its
effect.28 It does not make any changes to the type of state and local taxes
that may be deducted; instead, it limits the aggregate amount of the
deduction to $10,000 per year—$5,000 in the case of married taxpayers
filing separately.29 Consequently, the TCJA disproportionately impacts
married persons by allowing each only one-half of the deduction allowable
to those filing as single or head of household.30 The remaining value
of the deduction of state and local taxes is diminished further by other
changes found in the TCJA. As in the past, only individuals who itemize
their deductions may use the deduction.31 The deduction is only useful to
the extent that a taxpayer’s personal itemized deductions exceed her
standard deduction because, under § 63, a taxpayer is entitled to deduct
the larger of her personal itemized deductions or her standard deduction.32
The tax savings derived from the SALT deductions therefore depends
on the extent the allowed total personal itemized deductions exceed the
standard deduction.33 The TCJA also made a significant change in the

26. See Gladriel Shobe, Disaggregating the State and Local Tax Deduction, 35 VA.
TAX REV. 327, 339 (2016) (first citing Lawrence B. Lindsey, Federal Deductibility of State
and Local Taxes: A Test of Public Choice by Representative Government, in FISCAL
FEDERALISM: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 166–67 (Harvey S. Rosen ed., 1988); and then citing
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 § 501 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 164(b))).
27. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. § 1405(a) (2014); CONNIE
MACK ET AL., PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND
PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 61, 83 (2005).
28. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054, 2085–
86 (2017) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 164(b) (2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(6).
32. Id. § 63. See generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-7-13, PRESENT LAW
AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATED TO FEDERAL TAXATION AND STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FINANCE (2013).
33. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(6).
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amount of the standard deduction.34 It roughly doubles the amount of the
standard deduction. The table below illustrates this change35:
STANDARD DEDUCTION 2017 AND 2018
Single
Married
Head of Household

2017
$6,350
$12,700
$9,350

2018
$12,000
$24,000
$18,000

Before the passage of the TCJA, a taxpayer’s SALT deduction could have
been large enough to exceed the standard deduction and provide a tax savings
for state and local taxes. After the TCJA, the maximum of $10,00036 would
not exceed the standard deduction for any taxpayers. Moreover, the tax
savings of the SALT deduction depends on the amount of a taxpayer’s
other itemized deductions. These are principally composed of a portion of
medical expenses,37 residential home interest,38 “charitable contributions,”39
casualty losses,40 and “miscellaneous itemized deductions.”41 After 2017,
single taxpayers who are entitled to the full $10,000 will still need $2,000
in additional personal itemized deductions, and married couples and heads
of households will need $14,000 and $8,000 in additional itemized deductions,
respectively, before they will be able to receive any tax benefit from SALT.
However, some of these itemized deductions have also been reduced. The
TCJA reduced the limit for the deduction of qualified residence interest42
and eliminated the deduction for personal casualty losses except where the
loss is attributable to a federally declared disaster.43 The TCJA also eliminated
miscellaneous itemized deductions, which included the deduction for employee
business expenses.44
The combination of these changes substantially reduces the number of
taxpayers who receive any advantage from itemizing and substantially
34. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11021 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 63(c)).
35. I.R.C. § 63(c)(6)–(7).
36. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11042 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 164(b)(6)).
37. Id. § 11027 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 213(f)). Section 213 grants a deduction
for certain medical expenses that exceed 10% of adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 213(f)(2).
TCJA temporarily reduced that threshold to 7.5% through 2018. Id.
38. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11043 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)).
39. Id. § 11023 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)).
40. Id. § 11044 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 165(c)(3)).
41. Id. § 11045 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 67).
42. See id. § 11043 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)) (reducing the limit
on qualified residence interest from $1 million of indebtedness to $750,000 of indebtedness).
43. See id. § 11044 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 165(h)(5)).
44. See id. § 11045 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 67(g)).
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reduces the tax savings by those who still can itemize.45 The value of the
SALT deduction would have been reduced for many taxpayers even if the
TCJA had not provided a $10,000 cap.46
The TCJA has one further change that reduced the tax savings from the
SALT deduction: it provided lower tax rates for individual taxpayers.47
These tax rates reduce the value of the deduction for individuals. The tax
savings provided by a deduction can be measured by the amount of the
deduction times the effective tax rate.48 The effective rates or tax brackets
for individuals were lowered between 3% and 7% under the new act.49
Consequently, even if the taxpayer received the full effective deduction
of $10,000 under the TCJA, this would be worth between $300 and $700
less in tax savings to an individual taxpayer.50
The changes will significantly affect whether taxpayers itemize their
deductions. Joint Committee on Taxation estimates indicate that the number
of taxpayers who itemize their deductions will decline from 46,513,000
in 2017 to 18,011,000 in 201851—a decline greater than 60%. For those
who claim a deduction for state and local tax, the 42,262,000 returns in
2017 will decrease to 16,624,000 in 201852—a decrease greater than 60%.
45. For example, with a decrease in the amount of itemized deductions a taxpayer
can take and an increase in the amount of the standard deduction, a taxpayer’s itemized
deductions may not exceed the standard deduction or may be less valuable than in recent
years. See Howard Gleckman, 21 Million Taxpayers Will Stop Taking Charitable Deductions
Under the New Tax Law, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2018, 3:52 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
beltway/2018/01/11/21-million-taxpayers-will-stop-taking-charitable-deductions-underthe-new-tax-law/#2388d340238f [https://perma.cc/TK37-XBUE].
46. See, e.g., Robert Bellafiore, Who Benefits from the State and Local Tax Deduction?,
TAX FOUND. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/salt-deduction-benefit/ [https://perma.cc/
JV8T-J5BT].
47. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11001 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1(j)).
48. See Tax Credits vs. Tax Deductions, US TAX CTR., https://www.irs.com/articles/
tax-credits-vs-tax-deductions [https://perma.cc/8S22-EUHC].
49. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11001 (codified as amended at § 1(j)).
50. For a discussion of the lower rates enacted in 1986, see Robert Tannenwald,
The U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 and State Tax Competitiveness, in COMPETITION AMONG
STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM
177, 177 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991) (“[B]y collapsing the structure
of federal income tax rates, the [Act] increased both the level and dispersion of the net
burden of top statutory income-tax rates among states.”).
51. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TABLES RELATED TO THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS
IN EFFECT 2017 THROUGH 2016, JCX-32-18, 6 tbl.5 (2018).
52. Id. at 8 tbl.7.
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The total tax savings from the SALT deduction is projected to decrease
dramatically as well. In 2017, the estimated total tax savings attributable
to SALT was $109,443,000,000.53 In 2018, the estimated total tax savings
attributed to SALT will be $20,282,000,000.54 This change represents
additional taxes of over $89 billion.55 The average tax savings enjoyed by
approximately 42 million taxpayers in 2017 was $2,590.56 The average
tax savings enjoyed by approximately 16 million taxpayers in 2018 will
be $1,220.57 Twenty-six million taxpayers lose the entire federal tax benefit
of paying state and local taxes; sixteen million taxpayers lose an average
of over one-half of the federal tax benefit of paying state and local taxes.58
Individual business taxpayers are treated somewhat differently. The
Internal Revenue Code still permits the deduction of state and local real
and personal property taxes, which are classified as general business expenses
or above the line deductions59 as opposed to non-business personal itemized
deductions.60 Individual business state and local income taxes, however,
are covered by the $10,000 limitation and remain personal itemized

Income Category
Less than $10,000
$10,000 to $20,000
$20,000 to $30,000
$30,000 to $40,000
$40,000 to $50,000
$50,000 to $75,000
$75,000 to $100,000
$100,000 to $200,000
$200,000 to $500,000
$500,000 to $1,000,000
$1,000,000 and over
Total, All Taxpayers
Id.

2018
$ Millions
Returns
(Thousands)
[2]
5
7
50
25
109
64
214
128
421
846
1,811
1,734
2,286
6,920
6,382
7,081
4,148
2,191
780
1,287
481
16,624
20,282

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
For a definition of above the line deductions, see Above the Line Deduction,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/above-the-line-deduction.asp [https://
perma.cc/Y7V2-MM37].
60. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054, 2085–
86 (2017) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 164 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)). General sales
taxes collected by business on consumers’ purchases will neither be included in income
nor deducted by the business. See I.R.C. § 164(b)(5)(D).
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53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

2017
$ Millions
Returns
(Thousands)
[2]
3
17
161
92
477
275
1,027
531
1,635
3,220
5,799
5,576
6,189
27,878
17,650
26,160
7,816
11,491
1,015
34,202
490
42,262
109,443
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deductions.61 This applies to all profit-making investment and business
activities undertaken by individuals as sole proprietors or through passthrough entities, including partnerships, limited liability companies, and
S corporations.62
The deductibility of state and local taxes by taxable corporations has
not changed under the TCJA. They are still permitted a full deduction for
state and local taxes.63 The TCJA, however, has made a significant change
in the tax savings attributable to the deduction of state and local taxes for
corporations—what can be referred to as the after-tax cost of paying state
and local taxes.64 In the TCJA, Congress reduced the tax rate on corporate
income from the standard rate of 34% to 21%.65 To illustrate this point,
assume that Corporation X had $1,000,000 in federal taxable income and
deductible state and local tax expenditures of $100,000 in both 2017 and
2018. Using the rate of 34% for 2017 and 21% for 2018, the tax savings
of a $100,000 SALT deduction in 2017 and 2018 would be $34,000 and
$21,000, respectively. The effective after-tax cost of state and local taxes
to Corporation X would be $66,000 in 2017 and $79,000 in 2018.
The TCJA will have a substantial, negative after-tax cost of paying state
and local taxes for both individuals and businesses.66 Many taxpayers will
consider this cost as a significant factor in their future business activities.
The purpose of this paper is to understand the consequences of the TCJA
on state and local governments due to its direct effect on taxpayers. To
appreciate the consequences, one needs to examine the problems of state
taxation and spending in a federal system. This is referred to as fiscal
federalism.67

61. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11042 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 63(d), 164(a),
164(b)(6)).
62. See I.R.C. § 164(a). Income and deductible expenses of partnerships, limited
liability companies, and subchapter S corporations are included in the individual income
tax of their owners. For partnership and limited liability company income distributions,
see id. § 704(a). For S corporation income tax distributions, see id. § 1366.
63. See id. § 164(a).
64. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 13001 (codified as amended at I.R.C § 11(b)).
65. Id.
66. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 51.
67. See Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among
Jurisdiction, Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 348–52
(1988).
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IV. FISCAL FEDERALISM
Governments can be classified on a sliding scale from unitary to federal.68
A unitary government is one in which the national government does not
share power with regional or subnational governmental units.69 Conversely,
federal governments, in their most general sense, are nations in which
governmental functions are shared in some fashion between central and
regional units.70 Fiscal federalism, in turn, is concerned with the forms of
and dynamics between multilevel governments.71 It often addresses the
problems that result from situations where both federal and state governments
act concurrently.72
“Contrasting forces, some leading to increased fiscal centralization and
some to greater decentralization, are producing an ongoing restructuring of
public sectors throughout the world.”73 The trend is toward decentralization
in the United States.74 Traditional theories of federalism principally deal
with the mix of regulatory powers between federal and state governments.75
When legal scholars turn to taxation and federalism, their focus tends to
be on the limitations on state action imposed through the exercise of judicial
review under the U.S. Constitution and the Commerce Clause.76 The
Constitution was formulated at a time when transportation other than by sea
presented barriers to trade and business mobility. The founding fathers were
concerned with state laws that restricted commerce and the free movement
of persons; simultaneously, state governments taxed little and provided
most of their revenue needs through user fees and sales of land.77 Interstate
tax competition was simply not an issue. Indeed, American scholarship

68. See David Fontana, Relational Federalism: An Essay in Honor of Heather Gerken,
48 TULSA L. REV. 503, 506–07 (2017).
69. See id. at 506.
70. See id. at 507.
71. Wallace E. Oates, Toward a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism,
12 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 349, 349 (2005).
72. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2551,
2553 (2005).
73. See Oates, supra note 71.
74. Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance
in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 611 (2007).
75. Super, supra note 72, at 2551.
76. See, e.g., WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 23–25, 115–21 (10th ed. 2014). But see Daniel Shaviro, An Economic
and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 955, 963–66 (1992)
(looking at legal issues under the Commerce Clause and examining issues relating to tax
competition).
77. For a history of property taxes, see William B. Barker, The Three Faces of
Equality: Constitutional Requirements in Taxation, 57 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 1, 14–
18 (2006).
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views the promotion of advantageous tax competition as one of the principle
consequences of state sovereign tax powers.78
State and local governments in a federal system are theoretically and
legally open economies with respect to other states. They cannot place
any overt restriction on the free movement of trade, capital, and persons.
State governments have also generally adopted policies that encourage
economic activity within their states.79 Like nations, federal states have
pursued policies that extend tax incentives to businesses and investors to
stimulate economic development.80 When federal states adopt these practices,
they engage in interstate tax competition.81 This trend, however, is not without
its detractors. The process of decentralization has unleashed a substantial
conflict between the forces of autonomy on the one hand, which support
the benefits of increased independence for state and local government, and
coordination on the other, which supports the benefits of centralization.82
In nations that were not created by federal unions like the United States,
federalism begins with a decentralization of authority.83 The simplest form
of decentralization is a delegation of administrative power to subnational
units to carry out enumerated functions.84 Although variations can always
occur in the way functions are carried out—especially where these functions
are regionally dispersed among many units—the goal of delegation is to
carry out the policies of the central government and ensure uniformity in
the provision of public goods or in the general welfare of the nation as a
whole.85
78. See Shaviro, supra note 76, at 960; see also infra notes 166–67.
79. See NORTON FRANCIS, STATE TAX INCENTIVES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1–
4 (2016), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/78206/2000636-state-taxincentives-for-economic-development.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8AS-SGUW].
80. See, e.g., Roger J. Vaughan, State Taxation and Economic Development, in STATE
TAXATION POLICY 3, 89 (Michael Barker ed., 1983).
81. Id. at 99–100.
82. See, e.g., JONATHAN A. RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND
PERIL OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 5 (2006); Shaviro, supra note 76, at 960; Super, supra note
72, at 2556.
83. See Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., Associate Professor, Univ. of the Phil. & Donna
Moscare, Research Assistant, Asian Res. Ctr. for Decentralization, Decentralization and
Federalism in the Philippines: Lessons from Global Community, Presentation at the
International Conference of the East West Center 1 (July 1–5, 2002) (transcript available
online).
84. See Richard M. Bird, Fiscal Decentralization and Competitive Governments, in
COMPETITION AND STRUCTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS 129,
131–32 (Gianluigi Galeotti et al. eds., 2000).
85. See id. at 130–32.
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Mere decentralization should be contrasted with devolution of power,
which results in independent local governments.86 When some responsibility
for law and policy belong to local government, federalism as a political
alternative for subnational governmental units becomes significant. True
federalism requires autonomy, which can only be created by contractual
agreements between central and local governments grounded in constitutional
or fundamental law.87 Federalism requires some type of legally binding
independence.88 Otherwise, if the central government has the power to abolish
autonomy, there can be no true independent action by local governments.89
Even among true federalist nations, governmental power is divided in
different ways.90 In the area of fiscal affairs, there are three kinds of authority
that are synonymous with governmental power and the sovereignty of
subnational governmental units: the power to tax, the power to spend, and
the power to borrow.91 These powers have the potential, when exercised
by subnational governments, to create differences between states in the
provision of public goods and services and the fiscal obligations of persons
and enterprises.92 By creating these differences, these powers can profoundly
affect the well-being of persons based on the state where they live or operate.93
The exercise of powers to tax, spend, and borrow can create fiscal competition
between state governments through the different supply of public benefits
or imposition of tax burdens.94
Although there are some federal countries with fiscal autonomy, few
have the three fiscal powers in like measure.95 Differences in the scope
of fiscal autonomy can be seen among three federal nations: Germany, Brazil
and the United States. In some ways, these countries share common features.
The differences, however, in the allocation of each nation’s fiscal powers
illustrates the wide range of possibilities federalism offers.
One measure of fiscal autonomy is the power to spend.96 State governments
in Germany, Brazil, and the United States have constitutional authority

86. See id. 132–33.
87. See RODDEN, supra note 82, at 32.
88. See id. at 33.
89. See id. at 32.
90. See id. at 38.
91. See Bird, supra note 84, at 140.
92. See id. at 140–41.
93. Id. (quoting COUNTRY DEP’T III, COUNTRY OPERATIONS DIV. I, LATIN AM. &
THE CARIBBEAN, COLOMBIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY: BEYOND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
5 (1995)).
94. See id. at 142.
95. See id. at 134.
96. See Jeffrey I. Chapman, Local Government Autonomy and Fiscal Stress: The
Case of California Counties, 35 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 15, 16 (2003).
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over spending.97 In Germany, for example, where the states are known as
Länders, “[t]he states are responsible for [expenditures relating to] culture,
education, law and order, health, environmental protection, and regional
economic policy.”98 In Brazil99 and the United States, however, the
constitution does not define specific responsibilities of the states.100
Instead, states are free to do whatever they wish unless it is prohibited by
the constitution.101 Pluralists like James Madison supported this role for
subnational governments based on the argument that decentralization of
authority provides many benefits, including the more efficient provision
of public goods and services. 102 This is due to the fact that smaller
governmental bodies are more responsive to voter preference and better
satisfy geographical preferences for government goods and services.103
By dividing governmental authority, a nation creates competition among
states and between states and the federal government, which prevents
abuse and promotes experimentation at the local level.104 These are the
so-called laboratories of democracy.105 The decline of central control over
the economy brings about the economic prosperity that was part of
federalism’s objective.106 This trend in the developed world can be seen
in the creation of Scotland’s and Wales’s assemblies and a substantial
shift of power to regional governments in Spain.107 In the case of a federal
regime like the United States, the spending power of federal states is
unlimited except in those situations where the U.S. Constitution grants to
the national government exclusive control of a matter or prohibits state
power under Article I, like in the case of foreign relations.108
The power over expenditure is the most common form of power held
by federal states, which typically is the type of power that can be granted
to aid administrative decentralization.109 Only in a true federal governmental
97. See generally RODDEN, supra note 82.
98. Id. at 158.
99. See id. at 190–91.
100. See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8–10.
101. Id. at 191.
102. See Bird, supra note 84, at 142 (citations omitted).
103. See Oates & Schwab, supra note 67, at 344.
104. See Bird, supra note 84, at 142 (citations omitted).
105. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
106. See Bird, supra note 84, at 142; Oates & Schwab, supra note 67, at 349.
107. See RODDEN, supra note 82, at 25–26.
108. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
109. See RODDEN, supra note 82, at 25–27.
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unit, however, is its power based on local policy and control. These states
have played a major role in the provision of many public benefits to their
residents including education, health, welfare, transportation and support
for economic development.110
The policies behind the provision of benefits are quite different among
the states of these three nations. Although German states have considerable
spending autonomy, the German constitution or Basic Law requires the
outcome of uniformity in the provision of public benefits throughout the
nation.111 In contrast, except for recent legislation in Brazil requiring
states to allocate 25% of their budgets to education,112 there is no requirement
that states in Brazil or the United States provide a particular level of
benefits. 113 However, the spending power of the states and national
government is concurrent. 114 Many national and state programs are
integrated, and the central governments provide funding to the states for
specific goals.115 Significant coordination of policies and resources occurs in
these situations.116 Clearly, however, the systems in Brazil and the United
States provide significant room for diversity in spending among the states.
Spending requires funding. One way for states to fund their spending
is through borrowing—a power that all three states have. In Germany and
the United States, there is no federal constitutional limit on states’ right to
borrow.117 In Brazil, recent federal legislation resulting from state fiscal
irresponsibility has put significant constraints on states’ rights to borrow.118
States can only fund expenditures through their own resources, which include
taxes, fees, borrowing, or grants from the central government.119 Although
110. See id. at 26–27, 158, 191.
111. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 72(2), translation at http://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html. This requires “equivalent living conditions.” Id.
112. RODDEN, supra note 82, at 193.
113. For example, in the United States, explicit Federal Government Grants to state
and local government in 2002 amounted to approximately $351 billion or about 3.4% of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and about 17.5% of total government expenditures.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 221 tbl.12.1 (2004). See generally David E.
Wildasin, The Institutions of Federalism: Toward an Analytical Framework, 54 NAT’L
TAX J. 247 (2004).
114. See Super, supra note 72, at 2593–94.
115. See id. at 2571–72.
116. See id. at 2557, 2563.
117. Compare RODDEN, supra note 82, at 158–60 (describing Germany), with U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10. The Constitution’s list of state prohibitions lacks limitations on state
borrowing. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
118. See Jonathan Rodden, Federalism and Bailouts in Brazil, in F ISCAL
DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 213, 238
(Jonathan Rodden et al. eds., 2003) (citing recent legislation that placed limits on borrowing
and spending on state governments in Brazil).
119. See RODDEN, supra note 82, at 76.
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borrowing can fund public benefits temporarily, over time, states must
repay borrowers with other resources including tax receipts or with central
government bailouts.120
State governments achieve fiscal discipline by following hard budget
financing, which requires a state to rely on its own sources of funding to
finance its expenditures.121 Soft budget financing relieves states of the
ultimate responsibility for their actions by providing central government
bailouts to financially challenged states.122 Bailouts lead to excess spending
and borrowing by states.123 In both Brazil and Germany, states’ fiscal
irresponsibility has led to massive federal bailouts.124 Consequently, both
Brazilian and German states have not had to practice fiscal constraint but
have been able to compete with other states by borrowing funds to provide
enhanced public benefits.125 Additionally, borrowing without ultimate
responsibility for repayment encourages Brazilian states to compete with
other states though their tax systems.126 Thus, the key to fiscally responsible
autonomy of state governments is responsibility in borrowing and the
power to tax.
The United States’ experience supports this conclusion. In 1790, shortly
after the formation of the Union, the federal government assumed the states’
war debts.127 The policy was to ensure the credit and financial position of
the new nation.128 In 1837, due to widespread economic troubles, many
state governments that had built up substantiated indebtedness were in
danger of reneging on these obligations.129 Although considerable pressure
was put on the federal government to bail out the states, it was clear by 1843
that the federal government would not assume states’ debts.130 Because
the U.S. Constitution did not empower the federal government to compel

120. See id. at 158–63.
121. See Oates, supra note 71, at 354.
122. Id. at 355.
123. See id. at 355, 360.
124. See RODDEN, supra note 82, at 196, 222–24
125. See id. at 224.
126. See, e.g., Rodden, supra note 118, at 230–31.
127. See RODDEN, supra note 82, at 57.
128. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The First Report on the Public Credit (1789), in 6
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 51, 55, 58, 69 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke
eds., 1962).
129. See RODDEN, supra note 82, at 63–64.
130. Id. at 63.
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the states to pay their debts, the principle that the U.S. state governments
are fiscally sovereign was established.
The third leg of complete federalism is the power to tax. The contrast
between these three nations regarding the states’ taxing power is dramatic.
German states lack independent state taxing powers.131 Therefore, German
states cannot fiscally compete with their tax systems.
Unlike Germany, Brazilian states have some autonomy with respect to
taxes. The principle tax imposed by states is the value added tax (ICMS).132
Only the national government, not the states, can impose income taxes
(IR).133 States have the power to tax inheritances and gifts (ITCD) and
motor vehicles.134 Municipalities can tax urban land property (IPTU),
real estate conveyances (ITBI), and services (ISS).135 State have greater
choices with respect to value added tax. The base for the ICMS, including
some exemptions, is determined by federal law, but the states are free to
legislate where the federal government has not.136 For example, states
have chosen many different rate categories for goods and a wide dispersion
of rates within those categories.137 Because of the decision-making authority
left to the states, ICMS provides the ingredients for tax competition
among the states.
American states present an incredibly diverse picture when it comes to
taxes. They freely choose between the types of taxes and the rates, including
personal and corporate income taxes, sales taxes, VAT, inheritance, estate
and gift taxes, property taxes, and many different user fees.138 Taxes are

131. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 105(1), translation at https://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg (“The Federation shall have exclusive power to
legislate with respect to customs duties and fiscal monopolies.”); id. art. 105(2) (“The
Federation shall have concurrent power to legislate with respect to all other taxes the
revenue from which accrues to it wholly or in part . . . .”); see also FED. MINISTRY OF FIN.,
F INANCIAL R ELATIONS B ETWEEN THE F EDERATION AND L ÄNDER ON THE BASIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 8 (2017) (“To ensure legal and economic
consistency on a nation-wide basis, the Federation has made extensive use of its concurrent
legislative powers in the area of taxation. This means that the Länder (together with local
authorities) retain the power to levy taxes mainly in the form of local excise duties, as long
as such duties are not equivalent to taxes governed by federal law.”).
132. See JOSÉ ROBERTO AFONSO & RAFAEL BARROSO, BRAZILIAN TAX AFFAIRS 5, 26
(2007).
133. FED. REVENUE SERV., MINISTRY OF FIN., TAX SYSTEM AND ADMINISTRATION IN
BRAZIL: AN OVERVIEW 4 (2002), http://receita.economia.gov.br/dados/receitadata/estudos-etributarios-e-aduaneiros/estudos-e-estatisticas/estudos-diversos/sistema-e-administracaotributaria-ingles [https://perma.cc/4ZXV-4NAJ].
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See AFONSO & BARROSO, supra note 132, at 27.
137. See id.
138. See generally HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 76.
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imposed by both state and sub-state governmental units.139 States also
fully control the tax administration and collection. In the case of personal
income tax, forty-three states impose the tax, and of these, forty-one have
broad based taxes.140 Only five states, however, adopt their own base; the
rest start with the federal base, subject, in many cases, to modifications
for both inclusions and exclusions.141 Eight states impose flat rates,142 and
the rest demonstrate considerable variation with tax brackets and rates up
to 13.3%.143
Nearly all states, including the District of Columbia, impose corporate
taxes.144 Standard corporate tax rates range from 3% to 12%, with some
states applying graduated rates to small businesses.145 With such a plethora
of tax choices, it would be difficult to find two states with the same mix
of taxes, let alone to find two with the same rates on the tax bases they do
share. Because American states have such wide latitude with respect to
tax choices, diversity and tax competition among the states is quite high.146
The limitation on American state tax power is two-fold. Like sovereign
nations in general, states are restricted by natural power and can tax only
on the basis of territorial taxation and residence.147 The Commerce Clause
constitutionally limits this sovereign power, providing that taxation

139. See generally id.
140. Individual Income Taxes, URB. INST., http://www.urban.org/policy-centers/crosscenter-initiatives/state-local-finance-initiative/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/
individual-income-taxes [http://perma.cc/6DP5-Z5WU]; see also Income Tax Rates by
State 2018, TAX-RATES, http://www.tax-rates.org/taxtables/income-tax-by-state [http://perma.
cc/U9WH-HFTF].
141. JARED WALCZAK, TAX FOUND., TAX REFORM MOVES TO THE STATES: STATE
REVENUE IMPLICATIONS AND REFORM OPPORTUNITIES FOLLOWING FEDERAL TAX REFORM
1, 6–9 (Rachel Shuster ed., 2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180327085430/Tax
FoundationSR242.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ZUR-656U].
142. See Income Tax Rates by State 2018, supra note 140; see also Individual Income
Taxes, supra note 140.
143. Income Tax Rates by State 2018, supra note 140.
144. See MORGAN SCARBORO, TAX FOUND., STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES
AND BRACKETS FOR 2018, at 1, 1 (Rachel Shuster ed., 2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/
20180717150707/Tax-Foundation-FF5711.pdf [http://perma.cc/6SQT-36F4].
145. Id. at 1–2.
146. See James R. Rogers, The Law and Policy of State Tax Compensation: Much
Ado About Nothing?, 4 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 101, 114–15 (2006).
147. See Frank M. Keesling, The Problem of Residence in State Taxation of Income,
29 CAL. L. REV. 706, 706 (1941).
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cannot be an undue burden on interstate commerce.148 Consequently,
American states are in constant competition for mobile resources including
businesses and people.149
There are two ways that states can fiscally compete with other states—
neither of which can be viewed in a vacuum. On the one hand, states may
compete for persons and economic activity by increasing the supply of
public benefits.150 This form of tax competition will result in increased
taxes or borrowing to pay for such benefits.151 There are complex tradeoffs between the supply of public benefits and the way states pay for them
through taxes or credits that provide many possible environments for persons
and businesses. In contrast, states can compete by lowering taxes.152 The
oversupply or undersupply of benefits may be the outcome of the different
policies, which results in diverse fiscal environments among states in a
federal system.153
Tax competition among states is only possible where subnational
governments have true tax autonomy. Although Germany, Brazil, and the
United States are all federal nations, only states like the Brazilian and
American states have the capacity to compete with sister states through
their tax systems. Brazilian states differ from German Länders because they
have significant power to tax.154 These powers, however, are not near what
American states have. State accountability for debt or the lack thereof can
constrain or expand possible tax policy choices for state governments.
German and Brazilian states both differ from American states in that neither
are required to practice fiscal discipline.155 American states, however, are
perceived by creditors to be sovereign states and are fully responsible for
their debts with absolutely no expectation that the federal government will
provide any bailouts.156

148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,
274 (1977).
149. See Rogers, supra note 146.
150. See Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Allocative and Distributive
Implications of Local Fiscal Competition, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 127, 127–28 (Daphne
A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991).
151. Id. at 128.
152. See id. at 127–28.
153. See Johnathan C. Rork, Coveting Thy Neighbor’s Taxation, 56 NAT’L. TAX J.
775, 783 (2003).
154. See Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in Brazil, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 577, 580 (2005).
155. See Richard Deeg, Contemporary Challenges to German Federalism: From the
European Union to the Global Economy, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 51, 57–58 (2001);
supra text accompanying notes 129–30.
156. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities
and States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063 (2013).

90

POST BARKER PAGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 56: 73, 2019]

3/18/2019 9:56 AM

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

V. THE PROBLEM OF DOUBLE TAXATION
Many have found fault with the SALT deduction. There has been a
general consensus that the real property tax represents payment for value
received for public goods and services and, hence, should be treated as
non-deductible consumption.157 In the case of sales and income taxes, where
the relation between taxes and benefits received is tenuous, the deduction
is considered unfair because it favors high bracket taxpayers who itemize.158
By favoring high bracket taxpayers who pay substantial state taxes, the
deduction decreases the progressivity of the federal income tax.159 Further, it
may not be the best way for the federal government to subsidize state and
local governments.160 Direct subsidies are more efficient.
On the other hand, U.S. states—through income and in some cases sales
taxes—have been able to achieve nontax redistributive goals through their
mostly autonomous systems.161 Indeed, the deduction is thought to increase
the progressivity of state tax systems.162 A common view is that redistributive
policy is best left to the federal government—as long as the federal government
is dedicated to re-distributional policy.163 When the federal government
is not dedicated, state governments end up playing a necessary role in
redistribution of wealth through taxes and spending.164
Opposition to the state and local tax deduction is often based on the
argument that there is an economic value to tax competition among states
because tax competition can promote economic efficiency in the provision
of public goods and services through taxation.165 “Intergovernmental
competition for fiscal resources and interjurisdictional mobility of persons
in pursuit of ‘fiscal gains’ can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes
for explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing powers.”166 Thus, those who
advocate significant fiscal constraints support tax competition, which acts
157. See Shobe, supra note 26, at 349.
158. See Stark, supra note 22, at 1411, 1413–14.
159. See I.R.C. § 164(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2018); see also Stark, supra note 22, at 1414.
160. See Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local
Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 484–86 (1996).
161. See Shobe, supra note 26, at 342.
162. Id. at 335 n.26.
163. See Oates & Schwab, supra note 150, at 141.
164. See id.
165. See, e.g., John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT’L TAX J.
269, 271–72 (1999).
166. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 184 (1980).
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as a check on excessive taxation by state governments. However, repealing
or limiting the SALT deduction hampers states’ abilities to raise their own
source revenue. Consequently, the debate over deductibility often concerns
the appropriate level of government services.167 This argument has been
advocated in the international setting as well, where the general consensus
is that this is a beggar thy neighbor approach.168
While these perspectives add to our understanding of the part played by the
SALT deduction, they ignore the fundamental problem of double taxation of
taxpayers by more than one sovereign governmental unit. Double taxation
is a well-recognized international and interstate problem where foreign
nations and U.S. state governments’ tax systems interact. It is, however,
a poorly perceived problem of federalism where federal and state systems
interact.
A. International and Interstate Double Taxation
Double taxation occurs in two different ways. The most common and
understood form involves international and interstate double taxation of
income.169 This occurs in situations where there is more than one coequal
sovereign with independent power over the tax base. Where transactions
and taxpayers have multijurisdictional economic effects, more than one
nation or state government can have an interest and a right to tax the
income.170 In the case of both international and interstate income taxation,
this problem is exacerbated by the fact that there are two primary sovereign
tax regimes: territorial taxation and residence taxation.171 The general
premise of territorial taxation is that sovereigns have the power and the
right to tax income that arises within their borders.172 The general premise
of residence taxation is that sovereigns have the power and the right to tax
their residents on world-wide income wherever earned.173 In the United

167. See Wilson, supra note 165.
168. See William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition:
Overcoming the Contradictions, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 161, 172–73 (2002).
169. See generally William B. Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging
Economies, Tax Sparing, and Development: It Is All About Source!, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
349 (2007); Vaughan, supra note 80.
170. See, e.g., John A. Swain, Misalignment of Substantive and Enforcement Tax
Jurisdiction in a Mobile Economy: Causes and Strategies for Realignment, 63 NAT’L TAX
J. 925, 927–28 (2010).
171. William B. Barker, International Tax Reform Should Begin at Home: Replace
the Corporate Income Tax with a Territorial Expenditure Tax, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
647, 650 (2010).
172. Mitchell A. Kane, A Defense of Source Rules in International Taxation, 32 YALE
J. REG. 311, 317 (2015).
173. Id. at 313.
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Sates, residents include both citizens and non-citizen resident aliens.174
Corporations are resident corporations if they are incorporated within the
United States.175
The most important international and interstate conflict over income
taxation is between residence and source taxation.176 Although there is no
principle of international law that requires a nation to relinquish jurisdiction
to tax once it is properly asserted,177 nations have largely tried to ameliorate
double taxation on a unilateral basis.178 Today, the doctrine that “source
jurisdiction is considered primary,”179 and that residence taxation should
defer to source, can be said to be a maxim of international tax law.180 The
two recognized methods for mitigating double taxation are exemption of
foreign source income181 and the foreign tax credit that allows a credit for
foreign taxes against the income tax of the residence nation.182
Although state governments follow the same general principles as in the
case of international taxation, these principles are mandated as part of the
U.S. federal system by virtue of the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.183 The U.S. Supreme Court has inferred under the dormant
Commerce Clause that states are prohibited from doing certain acts that
would put an undue burden on interstate commerce.184 As applied to taxation,
the Court has ruled a state must provide an income tax credit against both
state and local taxes for taxes paid to other states.185
174. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (2012).
175. Id. § 7701(a)(30)(C), (b)(1)(A).
176. See Barker, supra note 168, at 181.
177. See RAMON J. JEFFREY, THE IMPACT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY ON GLOBAL TRADE
AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 43–44 (1999).
178. See Barker, supra note 168, at 181; see also HUGH J. AULT ET AL., COMPARATIVE
INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 357 (3d ed. 2010).
179. David R. Tillinghast et al., Am. Law Inst., Int’l Aspects of United States Income
Taxation 8 (Apr. 1, 1983) (unpublished draft) (on file with author).
180. For a discussion of the history behind these principles, see Barker, supra note 168,
at 180–84.
181. For an example of an exemption system under U.S. law, providing a participation
exemption for dividends paid by foreign corporations, see Tax Cuts and Job Act, Pub. L.
No. 115-97, § 14101, 131 Stat. 2054, 2189 (2017) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 245A
(2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
182. I.R.C. § 901.
183. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
184. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353–54 (1951).
185. See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1805 (2015)
(ruling that Maryland allowing a credit against state taxes but not against local taxes is
unconstitutionally discriminatory).
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The Court, in reaching this result, applied the “internal consistency
test,” which distinguishes between a state tax structure that fails the test
because it is inherently discriminatory against taxpayers with cross border
activities and one that passes the test because it might result in double
taxes only as a result of inconsistencies between two nondiscriminatory
state schemes.186 The essence of the constitutionally mandated system is
that the principles of international taxation apply to interstate taxation.
Thus, it is a well-recognized and consistently followed principle in both
international and interstate taxation that double taxation of the same tax
base is contrary to fair and appropriate taxation and should be prevented
if at all possible. These double tax conflicts arise between equal sovereign
national or equal sovereign federal states, which can be referred to as
“horizontal conflicts.”187 However, the double tax conflict that arises
principally with the SALT deduction is where there can be conflicts of
different levels of sovereignty within a federally organized nation, which
can be referred to as “vertical conflicts.”188
B. Double Taxation by Nations and States
There is a second type of double taxation conflict that can arise where
one nation taxes the same or a similar base more than once.189 It can happen
where a unitary government or one unit of a federal system taxes different
bases that overlap. For example, one jurisdiction could impose taxes on
income, on consumption through a sales or Value Added Tax, or on property’s
value. One need only consider Henry Simons’s classic definition of income
as equaling consumption plus dissaving or minus savings190 to see the relation
between income and consumption taxes and the inherent overlapping
taxation where both taxes are utilized by a government. Property taxes
applied annually can also be characterized as a tax on the use value of

186. Id. at 1802. An example of the latter would be double taxation due to two states
adopting logical but inconsistent regimes for source of income for territorial tax purposes.
In the international setting, nations do not provide unilateral tax relief in these situations
but may provide relief through bilateral tax treaties. See Barker, supra note 168, at 180–
84; Barker, supra note 171, at 650.
187. THOMAS I. PARKINSON ET AL., COMM. ON TAXATION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND, INC., FACING THE TAX PROBLEM: A SURVEY OF TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND A PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE 446–48 (1937).
188. Id. at 447.
189. See id.
190. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME
AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (2d prtg. 1950).
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property consumed by the taxpayer during the taxable period, which could
be properly included in either an income or a consumption tax base.191
Taxation of overlapping tax bases is tolerable where all the taxes are
imposed by the same sovereign authority—the national government in the
case of a unitary state—because it is presumed that the legislature has taken
the various taxes into consideration in establishing the burden on taxpayers.
The key is the unspoken presumption that the total tax is not excessive.
However, many sovereigns, including American states, mitigate the burden
of multiple taxes internally by allowing deductions from the income tax
base. 192 This is the general practice followed for income taxation of
businesses.193 It is also followed for individuals; many U.S. states that use
the federal tax base for income taxation allow a deduction even for local
income taxes.194
The incidence of double taxation in a federal system is theoretically
different from international and interstate double taxation because the nature
of the conflicts in tax jurisdictions is quite different. Where sovereigns
tax persons and entities on their income, there are two primary bases for
taxation: residence and territorial, or source taxation.195 Although conflicts
arise among different nations or different states over overlapping definitions
of who is a resident196 or the appropriate source or location of income within
a jurisdiction,197 the primary type of conflict between nations or between
American states is the conflict between residence and territorial or source
taxation.198
191. The imputed value of the consumption of one’s own property is not included in
the U.S. tax base. See Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934). It is
included in the income tax base of other nations. Switzerland is an example. See Imputed
Rental Value: What Do I Need to Know?, CREDIT SUISSE (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.
credit-suisse.com/ch/en/articles/private-banking/eigenmietwert-das-muessen-sie-wissen201804.html [https://perma.cc/L933-D5XR].
192. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 164 (2012).
193. See id.
194. See Shobe, supra note 26, at 340.
195. Barker, supra note 168, at 181.
196. For example, the United States uses both the status of resident and that of citizen
to define those subject to world-wide taxation. See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924)
(ruling that Congress has the power to tax the world-wide income of U.S. citizens). Most
other countries adopt the concept of resident for world-wide taxation. See, e.g., ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 26
(2003).
197. See I.R.C. § 61 (“[I]ncome from whatever source derived . . . .”); Barker, supra
note 168, at 202–03.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 176–82.
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The SALT deduction, of course, does not operate where one sovereign
employs multiple taxes or where two independent sovereigns adopt different
tax bases, but it does operate where two vertically oriented sovereigns
operate in a federal system like the United States.199 Both the states and
the federal government can and do adopt jurisdictional bases that are the
same. These include territorial income taxes where an item of income that
arises in a state also arises in the United States.200 It also includes residentbased tax where a resident taxed by a particular state is also a resident taxed
by the United States.201 Where both the national government and the state
impose a similar tax, double taxation can be a serious problem. Further,
one cannot assume that one legislature understands the burden created by
multiple taxes and will adjust its tax laws to ensure appropriate burdens.
Even if one legislature adopts all tax laws and understands this burden, it
is not likely that two independent sovereigns—one of which is one of fifty
state jurisdictions and the District of Columbia—adopting multiple taxes
with different inclusions, deductions, and rates that apply to overlapping
economic bases will understand this burden. The multiplicity of the
tax systems of the various U.S. state governments amply supports this
conclusion.202
C. National and State Governments: Coordination or Competition
Double taxation is an inherent feature of a federal government like the
United States. Both the federal and state governments have independent
powers to tax guaranteed by the Constitution.203 Unlike Brazil where the
national government has the power to limit and coordinate state action,204
the U.S. system does not provide a legal mechanism for resolving those
conflicts that arise between national and state governments over taxation.205
Where the national government lacks the power to coordinate the tax,
borrowing, and spending powers of the states, it may only practically limit
double taxation by providing unilateral relief.206 International and American
communities view such relief for international and interstate double
199. See generally Stark, supra note 22.
200. See Barker, supra note 168, at 181.
201. See id.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 128–29.
203. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (empowering Congress “lay and collect” taxes); id.
at amend. X (“[P]owers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively . . . .”); id. at amend. XVI
(empowering Congress power to impose an income tax).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 118–20.
205. See Super, supra note 72, at 2093–95.
206. See Mitchell B. Carroll, Tax Inducements to Foreign Trade, 11 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 760, 760–61 (1946).
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taxation as mandatory.207 Relief for federal-state double taxation received
little attention in the debate over the advisability of the SALT deduction,
however.
Based on the international and interstate consensus, the remedies for
federal state double taxation are obvious. One method would be for one
sovereign to forego and defer certain kinds of taxes to the other sovereign,
giving it the exclusive rights to that base.208 The national government has
practiced this method in the case of property and general consumption
taxes.209 The national government has consistently not taxed real property,
thus leaving this tax base to the state and local governments.210 Additionally,
although the national government imposes a number of specific excise taxes
on goods and services,211 it does not impose a general sales or consumption
tax on goods and services.
However, the national government, most state governments, and many
local governments impose income taxes. The allowance of a deduction
for state and local taxes against the federal tax liability has addressed
the problem of double taxation in the United States.212 The deduction
has included expenditures for more than income taxes, including property
taxes and general sales taxes where the taxpayer forgoes the deduction for
state and local income taxes.213 Deductions for non-income tax expenditures
is supported by the view that payments to support general governmental
function adversely affect a taxpayer’s ability to pay federal income tax.214
A deduction for taxes is not as valuable to the taxpayer as a credit would
be. In both the international and interstate areas, a credit is allowed to
completely offset the resident status tax liability to the extent that the
federal or state tax liability is no greater than the resident tax liability.215

207. See generally Ke Chin Wang, International Double Taxation of Income: Relief
Through International Agreement 1921–1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 73 (1945).
208. Id.
209. See generally Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal
Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J. 1267 (2013).
210. See generally Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get
What You Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373 (2004).
211. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4071 (2012) (taxing tires); id. § 4081 (taxing motor and aviation
fuels); id. § 5001 (taxing distilled alcohol).
212. See Mason, supra note 209.
213. See generally Kaplow, supra note 160.
214. Id.
215. See I.R.C. § 901 (allowing foreign tax credit); id. § 904 (limiting foreign tax credit
to amount of U.S. tax liability on foreign income).
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The credit is a dollar for dollar offset against the tax due.216 The use of
credit by the federal government is not without precedent. In the past, the
federal government has utilized a credit system for federal Estate and Gift
taxes, allowing a credit for state death taxes against federal taxes due.217
A SALT credit could be practically utilized for all taxpayers paying income
taxes, not just for those who itemize their taxes. It would place the federal
government in the same position it is in when income is sourced in a
foreign country.218 To balance the respective interests of federal and state
governments, the federal government could cap the credit like it does for
the Estate and Gift tax.
On the other hand, a deduction for state and local taxes only provides
partial relief. The tax savings, instead of being equal to the taxes paid for
a credit, is determined by the amount in taxes paid times the effective tax
rate.219 A tax credit achieves taxpayer equity by ensuring that the taxpayer
burden will be no greater than the tax imposed by the higher tax jurisdiction.220
In the federal context, taxpayer equity could be achieved by one government
deferring to another government; the former must be willing to abandon
its claim for taxes on behalf of the latter, either by granting a tax credit or
exempting the base. Instead, a deduction achieves a type of inter-government
equity or neutrality. A deduction addresses the problem of double taxation
only partially: two governments share the base and offset the adverse
consequences to their taxpayers by each relinquishing a portion of its tax
revenue.
The federal treatment has not given states a free ticket to impose taxes
as high as they wish. Although many states impose income taxes, their rates
and revenues generated have not been significant compared with the federal
income tax.221 The states have implicitly recognized that income taxes are

216. Tax Credits vs. Tax Deductions, U.S. TAX CTR., https://www.irs.com/articles/
tax-credits-vs-tax-deductions [https://perma.cc/K3AZ-QU4F].
217. See I.R.C. § 2011 (repealed 2014) (limiting the credits for state taxes to a percentage
of the federal tax).
218. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FTC/C/10_02-05,
SOURCING OF INCOME (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/int_practice_units/ftc_c_10_02_05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EQY7-Q5PP].
219. Tax Policy Center’s Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX
POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/whats-difference-betweentax- deductions-and-tax-credits [https://perma.cc/4TPQ-TDY5].
220. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 98-5, FOREIGN TAX CREDIT
ABUSE 2 (1998), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/not98-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5EX-4MC8].
221. This has been true for both individual and corporate tax rates. See Income Tax
Rates by State 2018, supra note 140 (showing individual rates up to 13.3%).
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the primary source of general revenues to the federal government, thus
conceding to the federal government’s needs.222
The TCJA largely abandons the SALT system that has been in place since
the beginning of the modern income tax at the federal level; however, the
federal-state incidence of double taxation provides a justification for its
existence. The next section will examine tax competition among states
and the consequences to states of the curtailment of this SALT deduction.
VI. THE TCJA AND THE TAX COMPETITION EFFECT
The allocation of fiscal responsibilities between federal and state
governments is undergoing a substantial change in the United States. For
many years after the end of World War II, the federal government was considered
the provider of overall welfare of Americans.223 Federal legislation dominated
most areas of social welfare.224 Starting in the early years of Ronald Reagan’s
presidency, a trend developed toward the devolution of fiscal responsibilities
to state and local government due to a more powerful voice for those who
sought a smaller and less involved federal government.225 Consequently,
many programs that had previously been undertaken by the federal government,
including welfare, housing, and job training, increasingly became the states’
responsibility.226 The states’ administrative and financial commitments to
these programs entail significant additional costs.227
Taxation predominately funds state expenditures for public benefits.228
The need for additional revenue to fund public interest programs is occurring
at a time when the TCJA has drastically curtailed the SALT deduction—

222. See CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: WHERE DO FEDERAL
TAX REVENUES COME FROM? (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/Policy
Basics_WhereDoFederalTaxRevsComeFrom_08-20-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9BQ-MLRW].
223. Richard A. Musgrave, Devolution, Grants, and Fiscal Competition, J. ECON.
PERSP., Fall 1997, at 65, 65.
224. Stark, supra note 22, at 1390.
225. See Musgrave, supra note 223.
226. Stark, supra note 22, at 1391 (citing Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,
37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1120 (1999)).
227. See EDMUND F. HAISLMAIER, EXPANDING MEDICAID: THE REAL COSTS TO THE
STATES 2–4 (2010), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/wm_2757.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VS7H-2EKV] (discussing the estimates of individual state costs in changes to
the Medicaid program).
228. Gilbert E. Metcalf, Assessing the Federal Deduction for State and Local Tax
Payments, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 565, 588 (2011).
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a major prop to state taxation.229 The SALT deduction supports state taxation
by providing a subsidy for a state’s own source revenue.230 It has been argued
that without the deduction, state and local funding will likely fail,231 and
the states will underprovide local productive goods that aid economic
development.232 The reason for this is tax competition among state and
local governments.233
Tax competition among nations or states flourish when certain conditions
are met. United States federal states represent ideal conditions. First, they
are economically integrated because the Constitution requires the elimination
of interstate barriers to trade, capital movement, and labor.234 These states
share one currency, the dollar, which permits the seamless interstate movement
of payments and capital.235 Capital in the form of both tangible and intangible
property is also free to move across state borders.236 Free trade, capital,
and labor mobility among states permit businesses and workers to locate
manufacturing, sales, financing, and other business activity in any state or
nation.237
Where a factor of production like capital or highly skilled labor is
inexpensively mobile, the optimal tax rate is zero for attracting and maintaining
that capital or labor.238 Although there are costs associated with capital flows,
the factors of production flow among nations or state jurisdictions over

229. See Scott Ahroni, Biagio Pilato & Benjamin Silliman, Congress and the SALT
Deduction: Past, Present, and Future, CPA J., https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/01/22/
congress-salt-deduction/ [https://perma.cc/6X29-JRLC].
230. See Metcalf, supra note 228.
231. Id. at 567–68 (citations omitted).
232. See John William Hatfield, Revenue Decentralization, the Local Income Tax
Deductions, and the Provision of Public Goods, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 97, 112 (2013).
233. See David E. Wildasin, Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality
and a Corrective Subsidy, 25 J. URB. ECON. 193, 194–96 (1989).
234. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Barker, supra note 169, at 351.
235. See Kimberly Amadeo, US Dollar Symbols and Denominations, BALANCE
(Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/the-u-s-dollar-3305729 [https://perma.cc/
KL89-FQTJ] (“The term U.S. dollar refers to a specific denomination and to the U.S.
currency in general.”).
236. See Engagement in Interstate Commerce, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://webapps.
dol.gov/elaws/whd/flsa/scope/ee2.asp [https://perma.cc/7ME5-ZK8Q] (“Interstate commerce
means any work involving or related to the movement of persons or things (including
intangibles, such as information) across state lines or from foreign countries.”).
237. See Jon Bakija & Joel Slemrod, Do the Rich Flee from High State Taxes?
Evidence from Federal Estate Tax Returns 36 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10645, 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10645 [https://perma.cc/RXY7PF2E] (discussing that evidence suggests higher state estate, income, and property taxes
can lead to wealthy and elderly people changing their residences).
238. See Wildasin, supra note 233, at 207–08; John Douglas Wilson, Trade, Capital
Mobility, and Tax Competition, 95 J. POL. ECON. 835, 837–44, 851 (1987).
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time.239 Monied capital can flow quite quickly. Technologies, however,
freely change locale until they become coupled with substantial, unrecovered
investments in labor, physical plants, and equipment in a jurisdiction.240
While old capital may become captive and be a suitable base for taxation,
changes in the effective tax rate—whether positive or negative vis-à-vis
one’s competitive jurisdictions—will gradually change a state’s or nation’s
store of capital over time.241 An increase of rate will reduce capital in the
case of increases in tax or will increase capital in the case of decreases
in tax.242 These changes in a state’s supply of capital affect other states’
supply of capital in the opposite way. This is known as an externality.243
Consequently, territorial taxation of capital is largely ineffective and
counter-productive. Taxation of capital can be effective under a residencebased system where less mobile individuals are taxed.244 Even though highly
skilled labor and management has become increasingly more mobile, such
mobility is not costless.245 People tend to settle in a county and acquire
substantial assets that make it more difficult to move. In addition, people
tend to retain national or state allegiance.246 Generally, larger jurisdictions
have less mobile populations and workforces.247 However, interstate mobility
is greater because of the relative size of jurisdictions and because one need
not relinquish one’s national allegiance to escape undesirable state fiscal
conditions.248 This is particularly true for the elderly who have fewer
economic ties with their home state.249

239. See Wildasin, supra note 233, at 194, 196; Wilson, supra note 238, at 836–37.
240. See David E. Wildasin, Fiscal Competition in Space and Time, 87 J. PUB. ECON.
2571, 2572 (2003).
241. Id. at 2573–77.
242. Id.
243. Kaplow, supra note 160, at 480–81; Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis,
Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations, 5 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 177, 186
(2003).
244. Kaplow, supra note 160, at 458–60 (1996).
245. Wildasin, supra note 240, at 2571–72 (2003).
246. Tyler Schmall, A Shocking Number of Americans Never Leave Home, N.Y.
POST (Jan. 11, 2018, 11:31 AM), https://nypost.com/2018/01/11/a-shocking-numberof-americans-never-leave-home/ [https://perma.cc/R8GX-M523].
247. R.A., America Settles Down, ECONOMIST (Jul. 5, 2012), https://www.economist.
com/free-exchange/2012/07/05/america-settles-down [https://perma.cc/4Z9X-8BHZ].
248. See Bakija & Slemrod, supra note 237, at 1–3, 18, 23, 36.
249. See id.
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Business, of course, can be quite mobile.250 Corporations are different
from people because formal state or national affiliation for corporations is
less important today. Thus, business income taxes are most effective using
territorial taxation.251 Applied to mobile factors of production, traditional
source concepts often try to capture the return on mobile capital.252
Although basing taxation of mobile business on corporations’ ability to
pay may be desirable for redistributive purposes, it potentially drives that
business to another location.253 Instead, taxation of nonresidents must tax
on the basis of exchange—a quid-pro-quo for benefit received.254
Tax competition is about jurisdictions using their tax systems to incentivize
business and other economic activity within their borders.255 More and more
states and nations use tax incentives or holidays to attract business.256 The
evidence strongly suggests that most tax incentives are ineffective and
only attract investment at the margin, which might not have been profitable
without the incentive.257 Thus, granting incentives can harm states in three
ways. First, the cost of governments providing public benefits to enterprises
may exceed the benefit derived from increased business activity.258
A striking example is fiscal competition in Brazil aimed at attracting
auto manufacturers.259 One researcher estimated that each job created by
the subsidized business cost the government approximately $350,000.260
Second, incentives may harm less mobile businesses and residents who
pay higher taxes or receive fewer public benefits.261 This effect compounds
where increased business activity harms resident businesses by increasing
the costs of labor and other essential resources.262 Third, lowering taxes
to attract capital results in less available capital in other states or nations.

250.
251.

See Barker, supra note 169, at 351–52.
CURTIS S. DUBAY, A TERRITORIAL TAX SYSTEM WOULD CREATE JOBS AND RAISE
WAGES FOR U.S. WORKERS 4 (2013), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/bg2843.pdf.
252. Barker, supra note 169, at 349.
253. Id. at 387–88.
254. Id. at 371, 384–85.
255. Tax competition can be defined as a state’s or nation’s relinquishment, in whole
or in part, of its right to tax an economic activity, with the result that its effective tax is
less than that of other states or countries. Barker, supra note 168, at 172.
256. See Barker, supra note 169, at 363–67.
257. See id. at 363–67.
258. José Roberto Afonso, Sergio Guimarães Ferreira & Ricardo Varsano, Fiscal
Competition, in FEDERALISM IN A CHANGING WORLD—LEARNING FROM EACH OTHER 412,
419–20 (Raoul Blindenbacher & Arnold Kohler eds., 2003).
259. Id. at 419.
260. Id. at 420.
261. See PEGGY BREWER RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 89–93 (1963).
262. Id. at 101.
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This is particularly acute because of interstate competition where the nation’s
general welfare suffers.263
States and nations face a dilemma. Attraction of mobile business enterprises
may enhance economic development.264 States intensely compete for
national and foreign businesses.265 States and nations also need to exploit
tax bases within their control to provide needed goods and services not only
to their own population but to mobile business as well.266 Tax benefits to
business should not be greater than the benefits to the nation, and they should
be designed to actually achieve their desired goals. If business taxation is
not uniform between residents and nonresidents, residents will be harmed.267
Benefit is the one unassailable theory for taxation of nonresidents.268
Unfortunately, the theory provides no practical solution to taxation. Although
a locale may attract taxpayers for the specific benefits it provides,269 one
can rarely measure the public benefits from a particular locale, and thus,
it is rarely possible to derive an appropriate tax cost. In many instances,
however, jurisdictions compete by subsidizing business and underpricing
public benefits to businesses.270
VII. CONCLUSION
Although tax competition among states is inherent in a federal system
where there is a failure or an inability—like coordinating state tax systems
in the United States—the second-best solution was the SALT deduction.
The SALT deduction has operated over the years to marginalize the differences
among state tax burdens. It has done this by directly reducing the cost of
state taxation.271 By lessening the cost of state taxes, SALT enabled states
to tax persons, capital, and businesses that are quite mobile. The drastic
curtailment of the SALT deduction has substantially increased the cost of

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See Wildasin, supra note 240, at 2573, 2575.
See Afonso, Ferreira & Varsano, supra note 258, at 417.
See generally Wilson, supra note 165.
See Barker, supra note 168, at 164–65.
See id. at 193.
See Barker, supra note 169, at 371.
See Shobe, supra note 26, at 349–50.
See Oates & Schwab, supra note 150, at 127.
For a discussion of the SALT deduction, see supra Part II.

103

POST BARKER PAGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/18/2019 9:56 AM

state taxation to many taxpayers whose businesses or services are mobile.272
The choice for states is either to reduce taxation as part of a general nationwide race to the bottom in taxes or, alternatively, to impose larger tax
burdens on less mobile sources of revenue like property and sales taxes.273
This challenge comes at an inopportune time for state governments when
they are asked to take on greater burdens for the welfare of their people.
Amazingly, the opposition to SALT is based on ignoring a fundamental truth
about federalism in the United States: vertically oriented sovereigns create
double taxation.274
This adverse consequence of double taxation between federal and state
tax systems in a federal system has not received proper attention. Mitigating
double taxation has been a fundamental building block of both the international
and interstate tax order. The enactment of the cap on the SALT deduction
largely eliminates a partial solution to federalism’s double taxation that
has been an accepted part of the U.S. federal tax system since the beginning
of taxation in America. It harms taxpayers and the ability of states to
address the needs of their populations through taxation.
As this paper has shown, following the established theory and practice
of international and interstate taxation, a deduction for only a few taxpayers
does not go far enough in eliminating the excess burden of federal-state
double taxation. A more effective solution would be the allowance of a
tax credit for state taxes offsetting federal tax liability that would be limited
to a percentage of the federal tax.

272. Formal change of one’s residence for some tax purposes can be accomplished
by tax planning. See Donald Bruce, William F. Fox, & Zhou Yang, Base Mobility and State
Personal Income Taxes, 63 NAT’L TAX. J. 945, 961 (2010).
273. See Tannenwald, supra note 50, at 177, 199 (discussing how states lowered statutory
income rates on account of the lower tax brackets in the 1986 Act).
274. PARKINSON ET AL., supra note 187, at 447–48.
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